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Abstract: In the present paper, our objective is to examine the application of belief revision
models to scientific rationality. We begin by considering the standard model AGM, and along
the way a number of problems surface that make it seem inadequate for this specific application.
After considering three different heuristics of informational economy that seem fit for science,
we  consider  some  possible  adaptations  for  it  and  argue  informally  that,  overall,  some
paraconsistent models seem to better satisfy these principles, following TESTA (2015). These
models have been worked out in formal detail  by TESTA, CONIGLIO, & RIBEIRO (2015,
2017).
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1. Introduction and Outline
The standard model in the field of belief revision was created in 1985 by Carlos
Eduardo  Alchourrón,  Peter  Gärdenfors,  and  David  Makinson,  and  has  been
appropriately named “AGM.” Its basic characteristics are as follows.
The model was designed to show what a rational revision of an agent's beliefs in
response to new information may, or should, look like. An agent is an idealized entity
that accepts and rejects belief-representing sentences. The set  of an agent's accepted
sentences is called an  epistemic state. Agents and sentences are given general formal
definitions, so that they can be put to multiple uses depending on one's objectives as a
theorist:  agents  can  be  understood  as  databanks,  individual  humans,  artificial
intelligences,  collections  of  human  beings  such  as  scientific  communities,  and
otherwise, whereas sentences or beliefs can be interpreted as data, facts, norms, rules,
objectives,  hypotheses,  assumptions,  and  much  else  besides;  and  collections  of
sentences  can  be  interpreted  as  worldviews,  models,  or  scientific  theories,  among
others. An epistemic state can be operated upon so as to add and remove sentences in
response to incoming information, and to this end a few operations have been defined.
This  paper  focuses  on  the  application  of  belief  revision  models  to  scientific
rationality, and it examines how well the AGM model fares in this task. Section two will
be dedicated to an elementary exposition of AGM, during which we attempt to show
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how the model is consonant with principles we selected as ways of capturing intuitions
regarding informational economy.2 In section three and section four, we argue that AGM
falls short of being an adequate model of the scientific process and that informational
economy  plays  an  important  role  in  scientific  inquiry.  In  sequence,  we  explore
adaptations  of  AGM that  may enhance  its  informational  economy adequacy and its
virtues as a model of science.
In conclusion, we will not provide a formal model of scientific development but,
rather, provide informal considerations regarding this development along with informal
arguments for the suitability of  AGM-like paraconsistent systems of belief revision as
models of science,  as presented in TESTA, CONIGLIO, & RIBEIRO (2015, 2017).
These models turn on  paraconsistent logic, a kind of logic that was developed in the
twentieth  century  as  an  alternative  to  classical  logic,  in  which  the  law  of  non-
contradiction and  the  principle  of  explosion are  not  theorems.  Such  a  logic  seems
perfect to capture what has been called the learning power of contradictory states (cf.
TESTA  2015),  and  on  this  hinges  our  aforementioned  conclusion.  All  historical
information regarding belief revision, unless otherwise noted, comes from HANSSON
1999.
2. The Basics of AGM and the Concept of Informational Economy
The  AGM model  has  many features  that  can  be  seen  as  closely  abiding  to
informational economy, or so we shall argue. Perhaps its three builders were quite aware
of  how scant  information  might  be and how valuable  it  is,  as  one of  AGM's  chief
characteristics is its classical logical closure, which extracts as much new information
from the  current  information  as  is  deductively  possible  — as  if  no  stone  was  left
unturned. This means the epistemic state, which we may denote by “K”, is posited to be
identical with the set of logical consequences of its elements. Formally, this is written as
“K  =  Cn(K)”,  where  Cn  is  an  operator  that  outputs  a  set  with  all  the  logical
consequences of its argument.
Since this  logical closure is  understood classically,  if  K contains any pair  of
contradictory  sentences  it  “explodes”  and  trivializes  itself:  any  sentence  becomes
deductible and K becomes identical to L, where L is the object language the system is
2 Informational economy is one of several desiderata of belief revision models and of science, as will be
argued.
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formalized in.  Such a  set  would be maximally uninformative,  since true or  reliable
sentences (for instance) are undifferentiated from false or unreliable sentences. Due to
the  principle  of  explosion,  then,  non-contradictoriness is  classically  equivalent  to
consistency.
New information  is  presented  to  the  system through  an  input  apparatus,  the
epistemic entry, and there are two main ways this apparatus has been configured. The
standard  AGM  model  adopted  something  called  prioritary  revision,  in  which  new
information  is  always  held  in  higher  regard  than  old  information:  in  the  case  old
information  conflicts  with  new,  generating  contradictions,  the  former  is  scraped  in
benefit of the latter, which will be duly incorporated. Other theorists prefer the idea of
being able  to submit  new information to  close scrutiny before incorporation — and
perhaps  reject  it,  if  it  is  deemed  not  good  enough  according  to  appropriately  set
measures. For this purpose, models adopting non-prioritary revision were built. These
models put new information on hold while the benefits of updating the system (scraping
old information) to accomodate it are evaluated. If these old pieces of information seem
more useful, more reliable, or in any other way more well-regarded than the new piece
of information, then the latter will be ignored so that the former can be kept.3
In AGM there are three basic operations that dictate how a given change in the
epistemic  state  is  to  proceed:  expansion,  contraction,  and  the  eponymous  revision.
(Other operations, such as consolidation and merging, will not be covered, in favor of
an examination of the basic operations.) The three basic operations seem to work so as
to best satisfy four criteria of rationality. We say first that operations upon an epistemic
state must result in a consistent state, meaning it has not been triviliazed, and we follow
saying that they should be closed under logical consequence, which in standard AGM
means classical logical consequence. Third, we say they must account for the fact that
some  beliefs  are  more  certain,  informative,  explanatory,  or  otherwise  more  well-
regarded than others, and we will explore this notion further in section 2.2.4
The three previous criteria were plausibly seen by TESTA (2015) as hinging on a
fourth,  overarching  criterion  of  informational  economy:  operations  should  minimize
3 Examples of  non-prioritary revision approaches are screened revision and credibility-limited revision.
These classically-oriented approaches for dealing with contradictory new information will not be covered
here  and,  for  reasons  that  will  become clear,  we will  instead  favor  the exposition  of  paraconsistent
models, in which conflicting information is not always a problem.
4 There are various ways of of capturing the intuitive ranking of sentences according to regard, such as
epistemic entrenchment,  Grove's spheres, and  selection functions. See HANSSON (1999) for a detailed
account.
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information loss and maximize information gain. Closure maximizes information gain,
consistency minimizes information loss, and ranking sentences according to regard is,
arguably,  usually  done  so  that  the  more  informative  and  certain  sentences  will  be
favored. We will see that there are further requirements in information economy beyond
such processes of minimization and maximization, such as parsimony and perhaps, in
science, explanatory power.
2.1. AGM expansion and the razors
We begin this section by proposing three principles, embodying general ways of
capturing intuitions regarding informational  economy,  and we proceed to show how
each of the operations may be interpreted in light of such principles. It is, however, only
in section four that we provide an informal and exploratory analysis of how AGM's
could better  satisfty these intuitions,  as there are some consideration we must make
before that. It should be noted that these principles will be called razors, for the three of
them  have  some  conceptual  or  historical  relation  to  Ockham's  razor;  for  ease  of
exposition too we have unified them under this label. These principles will be critically
examined and defended in section four. They are:
 The razor of silence.  Do not assent to anything more than is necessary — in
Latin, with a somewhat different literal meaning, we may say  entia non sunt
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. What counts as “necessary” is up to some
interpretation and,  as we shall  see in  section four, the interpretation given is
important to evaluate how well  expansion satisfies informational economy in
science. The name of this razor is due to SOBER (2015), and it is generally
considered to be Ockham's razor and a parsimony principle.
 The razor of economy.  TESTA (2015) has pointed to what he has called the
dual  of Ockham's  razor:  do not  discard anything more  than necessary — in
Latin, perhaps we may say entia non sunt subtrahenda praeter necessitatem. We
propose  to  call  this  the razor  of  economy,  since  through  it  one  economizes
already held information, beliefs, or assertions like one saves money. Likewise,
we  could  say  the  razor  of  silence economizes  silence,  or  suspension  of
judgment.  In  this  respect,  these  two  razors  are  easily  seen  as  duals  of  one
another, as one preserves current judgment and the other preserves current lack
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of judgment.
 The razor of explanation. A way of putting it is: assent that which is necessary
to explain whatever it is that needs explaining (which may be, conveniently to
our purposes, observational data). This razor enshrines the spirit of science, and
it  should be respected by any model  of  scientific  rationality. SOBER (2015)
pointed out this is a principle at least as old as Ockham's razor, as will be seen
later on.
Expansion is an operation designed to add a single piece of information to an
epistemic state, along with all its classical logical entailments, neither adding beliefs
beyond that nor removing any. It is designed so as to respect the three criteria provided
above,  and we gather  it  is  structured  in  close  agreement  with  the  razor  of  silence,
making it so it at least partially respects the fourth criterion.  Expansion also seems to
abide  to  the  razor  of  economy by  not  removing  any  beliefs  during  its  operation.
However,  this  means  that,  unfortunately,  this  operation  fails  to  always  preserve
consistency: if one attempts to add some belief contradictory to another belief in the
epistemic state,  expansion will provide no mechanism for preventing the explosion of
the state through classical closure. In this scenario, expansion fails to respect the razor
of silence.5 (We will see how revision does not share this problem.)
Now, onto the inner workings of expansion. If K and L are to be epistemic states,
α a belief, and K+α the result of the  expansion of K by α, then this operation can be
defined using the following six postulates (cf. HANSSON 1999): Closure, which states
K+α should be closed under logical entailment.  Success, which states α should be an
element of K+α.  Monotonicity, which guarantees  expansion preserves any relation of
containment. Inclusion, which states the original epistemic state should be contained in
K+α.  It  should  be  noted  that  Inclusion  makes  expansion respectful  of  the  razor  of
economy by blocking any removals.  Vacuity, which states K+α should be no different
from the original epistemic state if α was already there — though, as it turns out, this
already follows from the other five postulates.
Finally, we've got  Minimality, which deserves detailed comment. It states that
K+α should be the smallest set that satisfies Closure, Success, Inclusion, Vacuity, and
Monotonicity. The importance of this postulate is its guarantee that nothing was added
5 It may be argued that this makes expansion disrespectful of the razor of economy also, for trivialization
leads  to  no  differentiation  between  (for  instance)  true  and  false  sentences,  and  losing  any  such
differentiation plausibly amounts to (perhaps total) loss of information.
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to K besides α and its classical logical entailments. Minimality makes it so expansion
respects the razor of silence in cases where ¬α is not in the epistemic state, as it avoids
comittment to anything but that which regards the new information-piece.
To conclude this section, we will note that a central result in AGM theory is that
the operations of expansion, contraction, and revision can be equivalently defined both
as a certain set of postulates and as a certain set-theoretic constuction; this result that
has come to be called representation theorem. (Though there is generally room for some
variation  in  the  choice  of  postulates.)  The  following  is  the  remarkably  simple
construction  for expansion that  satisfies  our  initial  requirements  and  is  logically
equivalent to the six postulates exposed here.
 The construction for expansion: (K + α) = Cn(K  α).∪
2.2. AGM contraction and the hierarchy of regard
Contraction was built to assure the definite removal of some belief-representing
sentence from the original set of belief-representing sentences. It's set-up so as to output
a  consistent,  logically  closed  epistemic  state,  and  to  neither  add  nor  remove  more
sentences than necessary.  The minimization of removals seems to be one half of its
biggest challenge, while removing sentences without disrespecting their  hierarchy of
regard is the other. A toy example may be instructive on why this may be challenging.
Suppose our epistemic state is E = {α, β, β → δ, δ → α, β → α}, and our wish is
to perform a contraction of K by α. If α alone was removed from E, it would promptly
be added back again through modus ponens, defeating our purpose. In order to prevent
this, some of the other four beliefs in E need to be removed, but no more than necessary.
One would naturally think we should remove the smallest amount necessary, but it is
also informationally economic to remove the set that aggregates the least total regard in
its beliefs even if it is the biggest of candidates. Suppose we have more confindence (for
instance) in {β} than in {β → δ, β → α}. Both sets, if removed, would be sufficient for
our task, and removing the latter, the bulkier the two, will prevent us from removing
beliefs  we  are  ex  hypothesi more  confident  in.  The  desiderata of  minimization  of
removals and of maximization of regard walk together.
The regard attributed to beliefs may be a function of their informativeness, their
certainty, their explanatory power, or some other metric, depending on one's modeling
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purposes as a theorist.  As we have learned from GÄRDENFORS (1992), the logical
form of belief-representing sentences do not capture the various  desiderata of regard
and, thus, in order to suit the theorist's aims in constructing a belief revision model,
extra-logical criteria will be needed to perform a useful ranking. This makes it so a
hierarchy of regard is highly valuable to the preservation of desired information — if
contraction manages to satisfty it, then this operation will fulfill the razor of economy.
All this must be done, we should recall, without violating consistency or closure.
If  K  is  an  epistemic  state  and  α  a  belief,  then  the  following  six  postulates
characterize the contraction of K by α, to be denoted by 'K–α' (cf. HANSSON 1999):
Closure, which states K–α should be closed under logical entailment.  Success, which
states non-tautologies should have been definitely removed from K–α.  Extensionality,
which  guarantees  that  logically  equivalent  formulas  will  behave  equally  during
contraction.  Vacuity,  a  postulate  that  follows  from  the  others,  stating  that  K–α  is
identical to the original epistemic state if α was not in it to begin with. Inclusion, stating
K–α is included in K; this assures no information was added to K during the process of
contraction, in clear conformity the razor of silence.
Finally, we've got Relevance.6 It was designed in order to ensure that only those
sentences  which  entailed  the  sentence  we  wish  to  remove  are,  in  fact,  removed.
Formally, it is stated as follows: β  (K\K −α) → K'(K−α  K'  K  α  K'  α ∈ ∃ ⊆ ⊆ ∧ ∉ ∧ ∈
(K'+β)). This seems to assure nothing is removed in contraction besides the minimum
sufficient to definitely get rid of the target information-piece, which makes it respectful
of the razor of economy for not throwing out anything unnecessarily.
By  the  representation  theorem,  we  have  that  Construction  can  be  defined
equivalently  to  the  previous  postulates  through  a  set-theoretic  construction.  This
construction will make explicit how it is that sentences are selected for removal in a
way that respects the dual of Ockham's razor: the razor of economy.
 The construction for contraction: Some subset K' of K, which does not contain
or entail α, should be chosen as the output of the contraction, with the difference
between K' and K being the information that has been thrown out. That being the
case,  if  there  are  multiple  such  subsets,  then,  for  the  sake  of  the  razor  of
6 Originally a postulate named Recovery was used instead, but this postulate is surrounded by substantial
controversy in the literature and, thus, following recent work, we adopt the  Relevance  postulate in its
place. It should be noted that this discussion is relevant to discussions regarding informational economy,
for postulates such as Recovery and Relevance are added to engender minimal change in contraction but,
for a lack of space, we will unfortunately not dwell on it.
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economy, we should pick the biggest of those which do not entail α. Formally,
we need a K' such that, for any subset K* of K, (K'  K*  K) → (α  Cn(K*)).⊂ ⊆ ∈
However, multiple K's might fit this description, constituting what is called a
remainder set K α. To chose amongst these, a ⊥ selection function γ is defined so
as to prioritize sentences and sets according to their regard. Even then, multiple
subsets might receive the highest “score,” and the best way to work around this
economically is, the literature has found, by removing the intersection of all the
highest-ranked subsets — if there is any K' to rank at all. Formally, ((K α⊥ ) ≠ )∅
→ (K–γ¬α = ∩γ(K α)), where K–⊥ γ¬α is contraction of K by α relative to the
gamma function.
2.3. AGM revision
We have mentioned that  expansion adds an information-piece to an epistemic
state  no  matter  what  happens,  with  the  possibility  of  this  information-piece  being
contradictory with something in the state  and an explosion resulting.  The namesake
operation  of  belief  revision  is  built  so  as  to  avoid  this  failure  of  expansion:  in
accordance with the primacy of new information, if such a contradiction exists between
new and old  sentences,  revision proceeds  by tinkering  with  the  epistemic state,  i.e.
removing information, so that the new information-piece stops being contradictory with
it,  and  only  then  is  it  added  to  the  state.  (An  obvious  requirement  is  that  the
information-piece  itself doesn't embody a contradictin.) Similarly to other operations,
the objective is to do so neither losing more information than necessary nor assenting to
more than is required. Once more, as we want to show, a conformity with the two razors
can be seen.
If K is an epistemic state and α a belief, and 'K α' is to denote the ∗ revision of K
by α, then six postulates that characterize revision are (cf. HANSSON 1999): Closure,
which states that K α is to be closed under logical entailment. ∗ Success, which states that
α is to be an element of K α. ∗ Consistency, stating that the revision of K by α will output
a  consistent state  if  α  itself  is  consistent.  Extensionality,  assuring  two  logically
equivalent senteces will be treated equivalently.
Then we've got  Vacuity and  Inclusion. The former states that if α is  consistent
with the original epistemic state, then no tinkering with K must be done, and thus K α =∗
K+α. The latter, in turn, states that in all cases K α should be contained in K+α, which∗
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means nothing more will be added in revision than would be added in expansion — α
and its logical entailments. These two postulates bind the operation of  revision to the
operation of  expansion, which in the latter's case means binding it to the postulate of
Minimality  and,  thus,  successfully  binding  its  addition  procedures  to  the  razor  of
silence.
There is another interesting result that ties  revision to informational economy.
HARPER (1977) proved a theorem that has come to be called  Harper Identity, in his
honor.  It  states  the following:  (K ¬α) ∩ K = K–α.  This  identity proves  ∗ revision is
bounded by the workings of contraction and, since our contraction removes sentences
while respecting the hierarchy of regard, then so does revision in its removal procedures
(which we have called “tinkering”). That being the case, revision also upholds the razor
of economy. It also establishes that contraction is not more fundamental than revision, as
the former is definable in terms of the latter. The converse is also true — revision is
definable in terms of contraction —, given that the following equality holds: (K  α) =∗
(K–α)+α.
This latter  theorem has been dubbed  Levi Identity in honor of its discoverer,
Isaac Levi. This provides a nice segue into  revision's set-theoretic construction, since
the  Levi  Identity  plays  a  role  in  it.  Following  the  representation  theorem,  this
construction is equivalent to the previous postulates:
 The construction for  revision: The construction equivalent  to the postulates
above is based on the aforementioned Levi Identity, and it is: (K α) = (K–∗ γ¬α)
 α∪ , where γ is the selection function defined for contraction. If the function was
defined so as to make the operation a partial meet contraction, then we call this
operation partial meet revision.
3. Application Problems in Classical Models
In this  section,  we wish to  argue  for  two theses.  First,  that  classical  logical
closure makes AGM able to model only extremely idealized agents. It  falls short in
accounting for many important aspects of the kinds of rationality exhibited by human
agents, supercomputers and, more relevantly to our purposes, scientific communities —
in  short,  the  rationality  of  non-idealized  agents,  which  have  limited  computing
capacities, short time-windows for churning out conclusions, and finite memory. (This
Revista Contemplação, 2017 (15), p.19-3827
Belief Revision in Science
topic  has  been  extensively  covered  by  CHERNIAK  (1986).)  Second,  that  the
classicality  of  AGM's  logical  closure  makes  it  unable  to  attend  to  demands  of
informational  economy  in  science  to  a  satifactory  degree,  due  to  its  inability  to
adequately exploit the learning power of contradictory information. In section four we
will suggest that paraconsistent models seem better adequade in these two aspects.7
3.1. Logical omniscience, irrelevance, and computational intractability
The first problem that comes to mind is that even when we're dealing with a
language that contains very few sentences, the number of logical consequences of any
given belief is infinite, with endlessly many sentences with soaring levels of complexity.
Tautologies  are  also  infinite  and  also  exhibit  indefinitely  big  levels  of  complexity.
Deducing and knowing all  these sentences amounts to what has been called  logical
ominscience (cf. TESTA 2014).
The  first  problem comes  with  limited  memory,  which  is  unable  to  hold  an
infinite amount of information-pieces. The second comes from limited computational
power,  which  is  unable  to  parse  indefinitely  long  and  complex  sentences  and  to
efficiently  search  indefinitely  long  databases,  however  the  information  may  be
organized  and  nested.  Thus,  no  finite  physical  system  would  be  capable  of  being
logically omniscient.
A third  problem  is  that  many  tautologies  and  many  logical  entailments  of
already-held beliefs are  pragmatically irrelevant for any actual system. For instance,
one can derive no practical application for an immensely long disjunction of which only
one disjunct is known or believed to be true. Thus, demanding rational systems to be
closed under logical entailment may be, at best, futile. At worst it would be counter-
productive, if the system has limited processing power and memory capacity: even a
system with an infinite memory and formidable search heuristics would be clogged up
by the  vast  majority  of  irrelevant  sentences  in  the  database,  and  thus  be  hendered
inoperant, unable to revise its beliefs efficiently or act upon the world effectively: quite
plausibly, the vanishing minority of relevant beliefs just won't be reliably found in short
notice.
LEVI (1991) argues  that  in  AGM an agent  can be interpreted as  being only
7 We want to reaffirm that the AGM model is constructed in a way that is sufficiently general to assure
wide applicability, and that it was not specifically tailored for this application. Thus, the model is not
being criticized in general, but rather being checked to see if its versatility includes modeling science.
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commited to these tautologies and entailments, rather than actually accepting them — a
proposal that would alleviate the problems of logical omniscience for AGM. (Also see
GARDENFÖRS 1988.)  This  is  a  minor  point,  but  it  seems to  us  that  a  relation of
commitment to sentences can only be captured by belief bases. For example, suppose an
agent is commited to β because the belief α implies it. This agent would not believe β
itself, but rather holds it on the condition that α is held: β would be removed if α was
removed.  We could  say β  has  no  standing of  its  own,  and this  is  what  makes  β  a
commitment rather than a belief. In belief sets, however, all information-pieces stand by
themselves.  It  is  only  in  belief  bases  that  we  could  have  sentences  being  held
conditional upon other sentences being held: sentences in the implicit set depend upon
sentences in the explicit set.
The standard version of AGM, however, models epistemic states as  belief sets,
making it  liable to the problems outlined in this  sub-section.  Thus,  it  seems that in
application  of  belief  revision  models  to  science  we  should  scrape  classical  logical
closure if we are to keep belief sets, or scrape belief sets for belief bases if we are to
keep classical logical closure. In section 3.3 we will see a further, and perhaps more
serious, problem with classical closure in the modeling of science.
In the next section, we explore another shortcoming of AGM which spins not on
its classical logical closure, but on its deductivism.
3.2. Non-idealized rationality: humans and scientific communities
The past 50 years of cognitive science has seen the rise of a field of research on
the multiple ways humans reason heuristically, often leading to irrational patterns of
belief-formation and behavior called  cognitive biases, which were extensively studied
by scientists such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (see KAHNEMAN 1982).
We argue  that,  despite  these  shortcomings,  not  only heuristic  reasoning can lead to
rational behavior, but it can even be pragmatically necessary to it when we are dealing
with non-idealized agents. Heuristic processes can output reliable and approximately
true conclusions in much less time and with much less data than deductive processes,
which allows for decisions within reasonable time and for successful theory-building in
a scenarios in which there's limited time for data-collecting and data-processing. AGM,
however, is commited to deductivism, meaning it cannot model agents whose rationality
depend on heuristics.
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We will quickly lay out a few possible examples of how heuristics may be useful
in  human  life,  and  then  analogize  to  science.  First,  it  is  possile  that  we  arrive
heuristically at useful models of the behavior of physical objects (i.e. folk physics). For
instance,  BAILLARGEON (1994) reports evidence that there are “highly constrained,
innate learning mechanisms” (p. 135) about physical phenomena such as collision, size
constancy, and gravitation, which allows children to get a grip on the workings of the
physical  world  at  quite  an early age. To give  another  example,  CHOMSKY (1980)
details  how  human  infants  learn  language  stunningly  quickly  and  accurately  even
though their observations underdetermine the correct grammar of the language being
spoken (the “poverty of stimulus” argument). These two examples suggest humans may
have flexible  pre-set  programs for  making the right  kind of  guesses (in  hypothesis-
formation and in conclusion-making) during theory-building so as to result, after a few
years  of  experience,  in  a  host  of  accurate  and reliable  theories  of  the  world.  (It  is
interesting  to  think  how a  tendency to  develop  such  mechanisms  could  have  been
installed in us via evolutionary processes.)
It is also sure that we have reliable heuristics for rapid decision-making. For
example, it seems to us there must be localized heuristic procedures giving us the ability
to quickly deduce the trajectory of incoming objects from scant visual data, allowing us
to make snap, life-saving decisions, such as some act of avoidance.
In a world with temporal constraits for action and limited resources for data-
gathering,  trading logical  rigour  and some precision  for  speed and low information
requirements can  heighten  rationality, instead of  hindering it. Heuristics are  sine qua
non for  non-idealized  rational  agents,  and  scientific  communities  are  no  exception:
science too has time and resource-gathering constraints.
First,  it  is  a  desiderata to  output  reliable  conclusions  within  a  few  human
generations, which cuts short available time. Second, it posits unobservable entities and
universal  generalizations,  which  are  not  deductible  from  science's  source  of
information:  the  observation of  particulars.  Third,  it  seems  that  science  would  not
manage to advance so quickly if it did not pick up presently non-deductible theories and
assumed them as true for the purposes of research (i.e. as working hypothesis), since
such practice often leads to new discoveries. Perhaps science would be mostly stagnant
without it.
Given these three facts, there must be some non-deductive, heuristic processes
regulating the creation of hypotheses (containing generalizations and unobservables),
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which hypotheses will be picked up for reseach, and which will be presently held to be
probably approximately true. The process of theory-building and theory-confirmation,
then, has ineliminable heuristic elements.
3.3. Contradiction, learning, and scientific progress
We want to argue in this  section that scientific  communities  have,  both as a
matter of fact and as a matter of  epistemic  necessity, internal contradictions. Having
contradictions in one's epistemic state is essential to assure a reliable learning process,
so long as trivialization is avoided — or so we shall argue.
We should first note that some degree of epistemic resilience is rational, so as to
let  enough data sink in before passing judgment and rejecting long-held theories.  If
one's model has a history of wide-ranging predictive success and empirical adequacy to
what  seem like reliable  data,  it  seems plausible  we would act  rationally if  we took
incoming  contradictory  evidence  as  statistical  flukes  or  only  as  apparently
contradictory, as in the case of Uranus's orbit which only seemed impossible because we
lacked  data  on  Nepture,  or  as  in  the  case  of  the  incompatibility  between  quantum
mechanics and general relativity, which we hope is only apparent.
This  epistemic  resilience  is  not  absolute,  however.  We  gather  the  following
metaphor  will  enlighten  the  logic  of  epistemic  resilience.  The  strenght  of  the
contradictory evidence must get above a certain  critical mass (whose value should be
set according to the reliability of our model) before it warrants a model revision, or
before it makes rational for us to throw out our model and attempt to erect a brand new
model  upon  the  new  evidence  (a  scientific  revolution).  It  is  widely  believed  that
scientific revolutions only occur once a certain critical mass of problems accretes, even
if this critical mass may not be as big as some have thought it to be (cf. LAUDAN
1990). This makes sense when one considers that discarding a reliable, promising, and
thus good model upon insufficiently strong evidence is not a rational move.
This line of thought has unfavorable consequences to the adequacy of AGM as a
model of rationality in science. The AGM model obliges one to either incorporate or
reject each incoming contradictory evidence; if we take its prioritary revision version, it
always incorporates new evidence. If  non-prioritary revision is adopted instead, each
contradictory  evidence  is  either  incorporated  or  thrown  out,  and  there  is  never  an
accretion of pieces information to reach a critical mass before revision. All reform is
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piece-meal, which, as we have seen, will not do. Thus, substantial model revisions in
AGM cannot be rational.
An  alternative  model  of  rationality  is  needed,  one  that  can  temporarily
acommodate masses of contradictory statements without trivialization, until a rational
theory revision can be incurred. We can now see how contradictory states can have the
sort of learning power mentioned before. It is precisely to capture the learning power of
contradiction that AGM-like paraconsistent models of belief revision will come in, since
they can handle contradictions well while preserving the dynamic character of epistemic
states, as has been shown in TESTA (2015) and detailed in TESTA, CONIGLIO, &
RIBEIRO (2015, 2017).
4. Information and Paraconsistency: Rationale and Solutions
The  razor  of  silence,  which  we  have  seen  is  Ockham's  razor,  has  reached
contemporaneity as a strong motivating force in analytic philosophy, theoretical physics,
and evolutionary biology (cf. SOBER 2015). There is a general conviction that some
version of it must be true: perhaps nature is inherently simple, or perhaps parsimony is a
truth-conducive methodological principle for other reasons. String theory, for instance,
has received considerable acceptance in part by appeal to its perceived elegance and
simplicity. Modal realism, on the other hand, has crucial and wide-ranging applications,
but has been generally neglected for being as unparsimonious as a theory could possibly
be. Too high a price to pay, it is said.
In this section we intend to explore further the virtues and shortcomings of this
razor and of its dual, the razor of economy. Furthermore, SOBER (2015) has mentioned
that the original formulation of Ockham's razor had two opposing aspects, one negative
and one positive,  but that  the latter  has been forgotten over time.  We may call  this
positive side the razor of explanation, and we will argue that our other two razors would
be improved by an interplay with the  razor of explanation. It is worth quoting Sober
(2015, p. 7) in full on this:
The  maxim that  often  comes  to  mind  when  people  now  think  of
Ockham’s razor  is  negative,  but  it  is  usually understood to have a
positive complement.  There is “do not accept a postulate if it is not
needed to explain anything,” but there is also “accept a postulate if it
is needed to explain something.
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4.1. The razor of silence
We should start with a defense of the razor of silence. First of all, as mentioned
above, simplicity has great intuitive content. Second, it prevents the clogging-up of a
system with limited search capacities with misleading, groundless, and “unnecessary”
beliefs.  Third,  it  is  a  theorem of  Bayesian  inferential  statistics  that,  unless  B  is  a
sentence known with certainty (or has an associated prior of one), it is always the case
that (i) the probability of A being true (without passing judgment on the truth value of
B) is higher than (ii) the probability of both A and B being true. Formally, it is a theorem
in Bayesian probability theory that, in such cases, P(A) > P(A&B). If we are to take the
most  probable  one  as  our  working  hypothesis,  we  ought  to  pick  the  simplest  one.
However, as our objective is being scientifically rational, we should not fall into the
mistake of accepting a theory so simple it is not explanatorily adequate. If we have
some theory with supposition A and is explanatorily adequate, we should only add the
uncertain  supposition  B  if  there  is  to  be  a  counteracting  gain  in  explanatoriness.
Otherwise, we should rather suspend judgment on whether supposition B is true.
A problem arises, however, when comparing complexity among theories that do
not share suppositions. While it might be possible to justify the adoption of a Keplerian
astronomy  because  it  postulates  less  orbits  in  comparison  with  Ptolemaic  and
Copernican theory and their myriad of orbits orbiting orbits, it seems it would not be
possible (or, at least, not with the concepts we have hitherto deployed and developed) to
compare, in terms of complexity,  two theories utterly different in their ontology and
postulated mechanisms. So it may be the case that the above bayesian theorem gives us
little insight in many cases, and this is why the qualified debate concerning simplicity
and Ockham's razor still rages on.
To tighten up a loose-end alluded to in section 2.1, there are at least two possible
readings of “necessity” in “do not assent to anything not necessary.” In a deductive
reading, what is necessary is only what comes in directly as information and whatever is
entailed  by it;  this  is  how AGM is  constructed  to  work.  However,  science  aims  to
constructing good explanations, as Newton has put it when stating four principles of
reasoning which have guided his theorizing in his  Principia Mathematica:  “We are to
admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true and sufficient to
explain their appearances, (...) for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the
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pomp of  superfluous  causes.”  (Cf.  SOBER 2015.)  Note  how this  is  a  quite  direct
statement of the interplay we will suggest between the razor of silence and the razor of
explanation.
For this reason, science builds general hypotheses and postulates unobservable
entities  and  mechanisms,  going  well  beyond  its  set  of  observations  to  generate
explanations for these observations. This means adding only individual observations to
our epistemic state will not be enough. It is  necessary  to add beliefs that adequately
explain the incoming data, if our aims are scientific. We suggest reading “necessity” as
being  explanatory necessity,  and to  make  this  clear  we should  amend  the  razor  of
silence to  say:  do  not  assent  to  anything  not  necessary  for  our  best  theoretical
explanations, unless it is a direct observation. We should call this the explanatory razor
of  silence.  Strict  minimality  of  additions  (razor  of  silence)  should  be  traded  in  for
explanatory prowess.
As a side note,  perhaps we can say the  razor of  explanation  is  also directly
related both to maximization of information gain and to parsimony. First, if a general
theory  is  provided  support,  the  theorist  acquires  knowledge  about  a  wide  range  of
entities,  well  beyond  the  observed  ones  —  maximizing  information  gain.  Second,
general theories explain a wide array of phenomena with only a few postulates, and
perhaps it is more parsimonious to state the simple and unified “Every x is y” than the
unwieldy conjuction  “x1 is y & x2 is y & x3 is y &.  .  .”,  with a conjunct for every
observed x. This is a path to be explored in further work.
4.2. The razor of economy
In non-idealized situations, information is usually pricy or scant, and prima facie
it seems it never has negative value if it does not generate contraditions. Therefore, it is
reasoned, it should be kept as often as possible, and from this comes a good rationale
for following the razor of economy. However, we should note that non-idealized agents
must, as a practical necessity, often throw out information, for the sake of resource-
management, in the ways explored in section 3.1.
However, such throwing out violates the razor of economy, which suggests that
this razor needs updating. Perhaps we should re-state it as: do not throw out information
without a good reason to do so  — and resource management does seem like a good
reason to do so. There is yet another such good reason for information-removal. During
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scientific model  revisions and scientific revolutions,  a lot  of beliefs are thrown out.
Suppose some theory T1 deductively warranted some belief α, and scientists believed in
α because they believed in T1. Suppose further that, through a scientific revolution, T1
was superseded by T2, and that T2 is neutral as regards α: it neither implies nor denies it.
Should  scientists  keep  their  belief  in  α?  They surely wouldn't,  and  we gather  they
shouldn't.  In science,  there is  no reason to  accept  some sentence which is  not  even
recommended by our current theory or our direct observations, and there is a strong
reason against it: it can be misleading, leading scientists to mistake beliefs they have for
good reasons and beliefs they have as remnants of outdated theories.
 Strict minimality of dismissals should be traded in for the sake of resource-
management and the avoidance of deception. Now a criterion of removal is needed, if
we want to keep some beliefs and not others. The razor of explanation, in fact, seems to
be  the  ideal  criterion:  throw  out  whatever  current  beliefs  are  neither  pieces  of
observation nor elements of our best theoretical explanation of the observational data.
We should call  such razor the  explanatory razor of economy:  do not throw out that
which is useful for our best theoretical explanation or a direct observation.
One should note that, in their explanatory overhauls, the razor of silence and the
razor of economy  seem to become even closer twins, since the former forecloses the
addition  of  sentences  beyond  explanatory  necessity  and  observation,  and  the  latter
enables  or  leads  to  the  removal  of  sentences  beyond  explanatory  necessity  and
observation. Perhaps they recommend the very same epistemic state at any given time,
which suggests explanation was the bridge between intuitions regarding parsinomy and
economy.
4.3. Conclusion: The razors and the paraconsistent informational economy
In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat: but in the
evolution of knowledge it marks the first step towards a victory.
       (WHITEHEAD, 1925)
In conclusion, we have seen that the razors of silence, economy, and explanation
are adequate in capturing intuitions about informational economy, and that, albeit each
has  its  own  difficulties,  sometimes  numerous,  they  have  substantial  grounding  in
intuition and reasonable grounding in articulated reasoning. Perhaps this is why many
theorists, such as Sven Ove Hansson, have included and argued for operations of belief
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revision that cared for informational economy. Informational economy is an important
ingredient of rational and truth-conducive investigations.
We have seen that  the  razor  of  explanation accounts  for  the theory-building
objective of science, and that it can profitably interact with the razor of silence and the
razor of economy,  tying it  up to the long-standing intuitiveness of parsimony in the
former case, and evading an unnecessary shedding of information in the latter case. If a
belief  revision system purports to model the rationality of scientific communities, it
should abide to the interplay of razors detailed above. The razor of explanation may be
optional for some purposes, but it seems obligatory to anyone aspiring to do serious
empirical science.
We have also seen how non-deductive,  heuristic  reasoning is  vital  to a  non-
idealized agent, and how it heightens rationality, instead of hindering it.
Furthermore,  we  have  seen  that  gathering  sizeable  chunks  of  information
contradictory to one's beliefs is necessary for rationality, as it allows for rational and
reliable theory revision. An interesting historical example may come from mr. Charles
Darwin.  We recall  reading about  his  habit  of  writing  down in  red  ink all  evidence
contradictory to his theory of gradual evolution (for he could not trust his memory for
such a cognitively uncomfortable task). He did it so he could create the opportunity of
amassing  enough  contradictory evidence  to  compose  a  convincing  refutation  of  his
theory,  which  had  much  confirming  evidence  on  the  other  side  that  had  to  be
outweighed. By taking in contradictions and keeping them as so, one can accumulate
enough of them to harvest their learning power and bring about a profitable paradigm
change, as philosophers of science call it, and reach better theories of reality.
This makes it so non-contradiction is an informationally expensive principle, —
what  Testa  refers  to  as  the  cost  of  consistency (cf.  TESTA  2015),  —  as  such
contradictory states are necessary temporal stages of a rational scientific inquiry. The
AGM  model,  however,  is  not  constructed  to  deal  with  contradictions  and  makes
contradictory systems explode.
TESTA (2015) argues formally that, while some clasically-oriented models are
able to deal with contradictions by either isolating or suppresing them, this comes at the
cost of losing the fruitful dynamic aspects of belief revision. Paraconsistent models, in
turn,  were  tailored  to  deal  with  contradictions,  and do so without  any cost  besides
sacrificing the intuitive  law of non-contradiction.  These models keep closure, which
extracts  as  much  information  as  possible  from  the  current  state  of  knowledge
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(something which may be only desirable up to a point, as we have argued), but throws
away its classicality and denies theoremhood to the law of exposion.
As has been mentioned in previous sections, paraconsistent models are able to
preserve new information as well as old, even if they may be contradictory. This does
not mean such models will keep contradictions permanently, but rather that they keep it
in for long enough to profit from them. GIRARD & TANAKA (2016) noted that an
operation  that  updates  the  state  so  as  to  resolve  contradictions  is  still  needed,  a
consideration which we gather is on the mark. Unless one accepts that the world may
contain irresolvable contradictions, a quite unpopular position in metaphysics, one will
hold  that  a  non-contradictory  state  is  ultimately  desirable  in  truth-oriented  inquiry.
Previous  models  just  failed  to  see  how  such  non-contradictoriness  is  not  always
desirable.
Contradiction-tolerant models are able to maximize information gain, and thus
fulfill informational economy, by harvesting the learning power of contradictory states,
which  is  precisely what  scientific  communities  do.  Contradictory states  seem to  be
necessary temporal stages of rational inquiry. It follows that paraconsistent models are
to be preferred when one desires to model scientific rationality.
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